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BANKRUPTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: USING TORT
LITIGATION TO SILENCE HATE GROUPS
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The desire to speak and be heard has a long tradition in western civiliza-
tion.2 This tradition comes in contrast to an equally long tradition of sup-
pressing unpopular views. Plato's Apology, concerning the trial of Socrates,
gives us one of the first examples in western civilization of an individual be-
ing persecuted for his views.3 Part of Socrates' unpopularity stemmed from
his attempts to get Athenians to reexamine their preconceptions and untested
beliefs by challenging those beliefs through a "dialogue." This dialogue con-
sisted of ever narrowing questions aimed at "getting clear ideas."4 According
to Will Durant, "[t]o every vague notion, easy generalization, or secret
prejudice [Socrates] pointed the challenge, 'What is it' and asked for precise
definitions."5 Modernly, most would find Socrates' dialogue a mere nui-
1. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Franfurter, J., dissenting). Justice
Franfurter's observation is a poignant one in that society are currently faced with such a di-
lemma. We are faced with the decision to protect the rights of those we despise in order to
protect the civil liberties of all, or to give up a portion of our rights to punish our nemesis.
2. After being sentenced to death, Socrates spoke to his accusers telling them that "[he]
would rather die having spoken after [his] manner, than speak in [their] manner and live" be-
cause to him "the unexamined life is not worth living." PLATO, Apology, reprinted in PLATO:
IVE GREAT DiAL GUEs 56 (Louis Rope Loomis eds., 1942).
3. See generally id. According to Alexander Meikelejohn, "[piresent-day Americans who
wish to understand the meaning, the human intention, expressed by the First Amendment,
would do well to read and to ponder again Plato's Apology, written in Athens twenty-four
centuries ago." ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GovERNmENT 20 (1948). Meikelejohn includes a discussion of Socrates' trial and execution to
demonstrate the difference between the creation of laws and consent to law made by common
consensus. See id. While my purpose in including this discussion of Socrates' trial and execu-
tion differs from Meiklejohn's I agree that great insight into the First Amendment can be gar-
nished by reading Plato's Apology.
4. WIuL DURANT, THE STORY OF CivILizAToN: THE LuFE OF GREECE 367 (1939). See
PLATO, Crito, reprinted in PLATO: FIVE GREAT DIALOGUES 65-79 (Louis Rope Loomis eds.,
1942). Socrates conversation with Crito prior to his execution provides an example of the
"Socratic method" that made Socrates famous. See id.
5. DuRANT, supra note 4, at 367.
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sance. To the average Athenian, however, Socrates was "the most dangerous
of the Sophists."6 Socrates' supporters, both ancient and modem, offer the
view that Socrates' downfall was his compulsion to walk the streets of Ath-
ens as the "gadfly" of Athens.7 Socrates' accusers, such as Meletus, called
Socrates a "doer of evil, who corrupts the youth; and who does not believe in
the gods of the state, but has other new divinities of his own."8 Meletus'
charges, however, do not identify the true reason for suppressing Socrates'
speech.
Nevertheless, modernly some argue that contributing more to Socrates'
ultimate execution may have been his politically incorrect views. Socrates'
promotion of the aristocratic model of government was seen as intolerable in
the cradle of Democracy.' At that moment in time it was seen as a necessary
evil that Socrates drink the Hemlock in order to save Athens from possible
destruction.'
The United States, like ancient Greece, has an ugly history of repressing
unpopular speech." The infamous Alien and Sedition Acts of 1789 are ex-
6. See id. In a society that was a democracy, Socrates argued for an aristocracy. Id. Au-
thors such as I.F. Stone have argued that his political philosophy was his down fall. See gen-
erally I.F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES (1989).
7. PLATO, supra note 2, at 49 ("I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state, and
all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and re-
proaching you.").
8. Id. at 41. See also DURANT, supra note 4, at 371; Xenophon, Memorabilia, § 20,
http//:www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Xen.+Mem.+1.1.1 (last visited Nov. 27,
2000). According to Xenophon:
I wonder, then, how the Athenians can have persuaded that Socrates was a free-
thinker, when he never said or did anything contrary to sound religion, and his ut-
terance about the gods and his behaviors toward them were the words and actions
of a man who is truly religious and deserves to be thought so.
Id. For those interested in Greek history the Persus Project can provide access to a wealth of
primary and secondary sources. See generally The Persus Digital Library,
http://www.perseus. tufts.edu (last visited Nov. 27, 2000).
9. See generally STONE, supra note 6. It was likely that Socrates was punished for his
views because he was an outspoken supporter of the implementation of an aristocracy. See
DURANT, supra note 4, at 372-73. This is not meant to analogize Socrates and those who
preach racial hatred in order to suggest that the present day hate-monger will later become
great philosophers. Instead, this should show that as a society we all lose liberty when an-
other is silenced. Socrates' anti-democratic views were to Athenians, as dangerous as racist
views are considered by modem Americans. See generally STONE, supra note 6. Cf Man J.
Matsuda, Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2322-23 (1989).
10. Intolerable as the notion of an aristocracy in ancient Athens is the notion of racist
speech in America. As a society we repeat the sins of antiquity by silencing our foes with re-
pressive measures rather than with the force of our arguments.
11. Michael Kent Curtis, Critics of "Free Speech" and the Uses of the Past, 12 CONST.
COMMENTARY 29, 34-42 (1995). Finding examples of men and women who fought to be
heard abound in history. In modem times we need only look to the civil rights movement to
see some of the most valiant examples of men and women fighting to be heard in a hostile
environment. See generally MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. WHY WE CAN'T WAIT (1964). See also
HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNrED STATES: 1492 - PRESENT 435-59 (1995).
[Vol. 37
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amples of early attempts by our country to suppress unpopular speech. 2 The
Sedition Act of 1789 was intended to silence critics of the Federalist Party.
Supporters of the act claimed that criticism of the fledgling representative
government could lead to its demise. ," Thomas Jefferson, a critic of the act,
realized that the statute was merely an attempt by the Federalist Party to hold
on to power by shielding itself from criticism.4 In a letter to Abigail Adams,
Jefferson denounced the Sedition Act as being, "as palpable as if Congress
had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image."' 5 Fortunately for
Jefferson, the Sedition Act failed to stop him from becoming president. After
becoming president Jefferson pardoned those convicted under the Act."1
Today, our nation faces a threat to free speech that is much more incon-
spicuous than the Sedition Act. This threat to free speech is crushing tort li-
ability. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) has found great success in
using crushing tort liability to silence hate groups. Morris Dees, co-founder
of the SPLC, has led this movement to silence hate groups by bankrupting
them.'7 Utilizing the garden-variety tort theories of aiding and abetting and
civil conspiracy, Dees has'crippled a number of outspoken hate groups."1 The
tort theories used by Dees have allowed him to hold the main organization
12. MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
CoNsTrrUION OF THE UNITED STATES 100-01 (1996). The Alien act allowed the government
to deport immigrants that it felt were dangerous. Id. The Sedition Act, on the other hand, was
an outright suppression of free speech. Used against members of the Jeffersonian Republi-
cans, the Sedition act of 1789 punished:
[F]alse, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the government of
the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the
President of the United States, with intent to defame [them]; or to bring them [into]
contempt or disrepute; or to excite them against [the] hatred of the good people of
the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any
unlawful combination therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United
States, or any [lawful] act of the President of the United States.
Sedition Act of 1789 1 Stat. 596 reprinted in GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1077 (3d ed. 1996).
13. See Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression From 1791
to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 263, 273 (1986). An indication that the Sedition act was in-
tended to protect only the Federalist party and not the entire nation for sedition was that it
ended immediately after the term of the Federalist president John Adams. Id.
14. Id.
15. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
16. See id. In the midst of these prosecutions for sedition, the Supreme Court remained
partisanly silent on the matter. See Gibson, supra note 13, at 273-74. Congress' refusal to re-
new the act and Jefferson's pardons of those prosecuted effectively ended this ugly chapter in
American history. Id.
17. See Morris Dees & Ellen Bowden, Hate: Taking Hate Groups to Court, TRIAL, Feb.
1995, at 24.
18. See id. The tort theories employed by Dees are valid. See generally Damon Hender-
son Taylor, Civil Litigation Against Hate Groups Hitting the Wallets of the Nations Hate-
Monger, 18 BuFF. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 95 (2000). This Comment does not seek to contest ele-
mentary basis of his tort theories, but rather to balance the interests of these tort suits against
First Amendment rights; the latter may in some circumstances outweigh the former.
2001]
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vicariously liable for the acts of members who purportedly act out the racial
dogma espoused by these groups and their leaders. 9 "Dees' alternative strat-
egy" has prospered where other efforts to silence supremacy groups have
failed because his strategy "both sidesteps the barriers blocking federal and
state legislation's effectiveness and overcomes the constitutional barriers
that protect freedom of speech."2 By bankrupting both the speaker and any
organization that supports or associates with the speaker, the SPLC seeks to
silence hate groups by taking away the infrastructure and capital needed to
disseminate their views.2 These lawsuits have demonstrated that whether by
tort or by force, it is equally possible to silence distastefully belligerent
speech.
A recent victory by Dees against the Aryan Nation, a group headed by
Richard Butler, highlights this issue.' Aryan Nation security guards attacked
Victoria Keenan and her son after the Keenen's car backfired.' The guards
purportedly believed that the backfiring car was gunfire. The guards chased
the Keenans until the Keenen's car was forced into a ditch.' An altercation
ensued with Victoria's life being threatened, and her son being beaten.
Based on a garden-variety tort action, the Aryan Nation was held liable for
$330,000 in compensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages.'
By holding the main organization liable for the acts of its security guards,
Dees' suit halted the Aryan Nations ability to spread its message by empty-
ing the coffers of the organization.
This Comment considers whether Dees' "side step[ping]" of the First
Amendment through tort litigation violates the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech.26 The thesis of this paper contends civil litigation aimed
specifically at bankrupting hate groups is unconstitutional because of its ten-
dency to chilling protected speech. In order to avoid the self-censorship of
19. See Dees & Bowden, supra note 17, at 24-26; Taylor, supra note 18, at 100-01;
David G. Braithwaite, Combatting Hate Crimes: The Use of Civil Alternatives to Criminal
Prosecutions, 6 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 243, 255-58 (1996). Some of the tort theories employed
by Dees include civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting. Dees & Bowden supra. Recently,
Dees used the theory of respondeat superior in his suit against Aryan Nations. Complaint for
Damages and Injunctive Relief and Demand for A Jury Trial, Keenan v. Aryan Nations, Idaho
Dist. Ct., County of Kootenai,(1999) (No. CV99-441) [hereinafter Complaint].
20. See Taylor, supra note 18, at 143.
21. See BILL STANTON, KLANWATCH: BRINGiNG THE Ku KLux KLAN To JusTcE 205
(1991).
22. See Kim Murphy, Jury Verdict Could Bankrupt Aryans, L.A. TIES, Sept. 8, 2000, at
Al.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. ld.
26. In writing this Comment I find myself in the dilemma set forth by David R. Fine:
"Traditionally, liberals have been thought to be the strongest proponents of free speech and
free expression. Likewise, they have urged societal tolerance and struggled to abolish hate.
When the two goals clash, liberal groups find themselves in a quandary." David R. Fine, Be-
ware That False First Step, 82 Ky. L.J. 731, 748-49 (1994).
[Vol. 37
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these groups, they must be afforded additional procedural safeguards when
faced with politically charged civil litigation aimed at bankrupting them.
Part II of this Comment will look at three applicable philosophical bases for
vigorous protection of free speech: the marketplace of ideas, sovereignty of
the people, and futility of suppression. Part I will examine the Supreme
Court's ever changing view of the First Amendment. In an attempt to dem-
onstrate the dangers of limiting free speech, this section will survey the his-
torical abuses of the First Amendment prior to Brandenburg v. Ohio. Then
this Comment will look at Brandenburg and the subsequent evolution of
post-Brandenburg decisions giving greater protection to free speech. This
section will also consider New York Times27 and Hustle?8 to see how the Su-
preme Court has protected free speech from tort litigation. Part IV will con-
sider Morris Dees' successes in silencing particular groups through civil liti-
gation and some of the issues raised by such litigation. Finally, Part V
proposes that procedural safeguards to better balance the competing interests
involved in civil litigation against hate groups.
II. A BRIEF INQUIRY INTO THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
A. The Marketplace of Ideas
Amidst the industrial revolution that was radically altering Europe in
1859, John Stuart Mill published On Liberty, his groundbreaking essay de-
fending freedom of speech."' According to Mill, "If all mankind minus one
were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion,
mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if
he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind."" This eloquent
statement is supported by powerful justifications. The commentator Freder-
ick Schauer has described Mill's argument as a variation of the "survival
theory of truth."'" The survival theory as described by Schauer proffers that
opinions and ideas are to be tested against one another and that "the elimina-
tion of suppression would consequently increase the likelihood of exchang-
ing error for truth."32
In addition to exchanging error for truth, Mill theorized that both good
and bad opinions have a place in society. The rationale is "if the opinion is
right," but suppressed, "[society is] deprived of the opportunity of exchang-
27. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28. 485 U.S. 46 (1985).
29. PETER N. STEARNS, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN WORLD HISTORY 1 (1993).
30. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. Inc.
1975).
31. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREESPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 21 (1982).
32. See id. at 15. According to Schauer a weakness of the survival theory of truth is that
it lacks any objective test of truth. See id. at 20.
20011
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ing error for truth: if wrong, [society] lose[s], what is almost as great a bene-
fit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error."'33 Therefore, under Mill's theory, false opinions serve
the purpose of crystallizing in the minds of those exposed to them the truth
of the correct opinion. A caveat by Mill explains this position: even a true
idea needs to be "vigorously and earnestly contested" otherwise "it will, by
most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of prejudice, with little
comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds."' The great fear is that the
true idea will be "deprived of its vital effect... becoming mere formal pro-
fession."35 Thus, even racist viewpoints have a place in a society of tolerance
if the people are to truly understand the meaning of tolerance.
While Mill was not the first to make an argument for free speech,36
Mill's essay would greatly influence some of the Supreme Court's most in-
fluential judges. These judges would later reformulate Mill's ideas into the
doctrine of the "marketplace of ideas." '37 Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion
in Abrams v. United States38 was the first articulation of the marketplace of
ideas doctrine. In Abrams, Holmes proclaimed that:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.39
Essentially an economic theory "rooted in laissez-faire economics,"' the
market place of ideas doctrine places trust in the average citizen that when
given two competing ideas contrasted against each other, the correct idea
will become apparent, and the false idea will fortify the understanding of the
correct idea.4'
Nonetheless, the market place of ideas doctrine, like any philosophical
doctrine, has its weaknesses. According to Schauer, "[t]he predominant risk
is that false views may, despite their falsity, be accepted by the public, who
33. See MILL, supra note 30, at 18.
34. See id. at 50.
35. See id.
36. See SCHAuER, supra note 31, at 15 ("Milton's Areopagitica, the earliest comprehen-
sive defense of freedom of speech, is based substantially on the premise that absence of gov-
ernment restrictions on publishing... will enable society to locate truth and reject error.").
37. See id. at 16.
38. 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919).
39. Id. at 630.
40. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuKE L.J.
1, 5 (1984). Professor Ingber argues that the marketplace of ideas theory is fundamentally
flawed because the dominant culture tends to control the market. Id. at 17. While Professor
Ingber makes a forceful argument, he does not offer viable alternatives to the market place of
ideas theory. lId at 50-71. However, I agree with Professor Ingber that more diverse perspec-
tives need to be given access to the channels of societal communication. Id. at 86. Compare
Curtis, supra note 11, at 34.
41. See SCHAuER supra note 31, at 21.
400 [Vol. 37
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will then act in accordance with those false views."'42 Race relations have his-
torically been subject to this weakness.43 This has led some to argue for civil
and criminal restrictions on so-called "hate" speech.' Most rational people
would agree that the ideas espoused by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and
Aryan Nation are clearly false. 5 However, the falseness of these groups'
ideas does not warrant their abolition, even though some would ignore the
truth." Furthermore, those seeking to limit the First Amendment in order to
punish hate-speech have largely ignored the power of counter-speech. 7 Real
world examples of counter-speech ameliorating the racial problem on col-
lege campuses have demonstrated that the marketplace of ideas doctrine is
not merely armchair philosophy, but rather a viable doctrine to be utilized to
its fullest extent.
48
B. The Sovereignty of the People
The abuses of the British monarchy led the founding fathers to adopt the
principle that the ultimate power should be vested with the people and not
with any government organization.4 ' This concept, that the people and not
42. See id at 28.
43. See id. Hitler's ability to fool the masses with the idea of the German racial superior-
ity is the best example of the failure of the argument for truth. See generally ERNST NOLTE,
THRE FACES OF FASCISM: ACTION FRANCAISE, ITALIAN FAsCIsM, NATIONAL SOCiAtasM (Leila
Vennewitz trans., 1965).
44. See Matsuda, supra note 9, at 2379 (arguing that hate speech can be outlawed with-
out abandoning First Amendment principles). See generally Richard Delgado & David H.
Yun, Essay 1I. Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objec-
tives to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. R''. 871 (1994).
45. See generally JACK LEVIN & JACK McDEvrrr, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF
BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED (1993); WYN CRAIGE WADE, THE FiERY CROSS: THE Ku KLUx
KLAN IN AMERICA (1987).
46. See Curtis, supra note 11, at 50 (arguing that exceptions to the free speech doctrine
will likely lead society down a slippery slope).
47. See generally Charles R. Calleros, Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-
Speech Codes: A Reply to Delgado and Yun, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1249 (1995). Professor Calle-
ros offers some real world examples where counter speech was an effective tool in the fight
against hate-speech. Id. at 1259, 1265.
48. See id. The SPLC's use of civil litigation to silence supremacist groups has com-
pletely undermined any possible utilization of this doctrine, and has thus undermined a central
pillar of modem First Amendment doctrine.
49. Jefferson in writing the declaration of independence took great pains to enumerate
the abuses of the King of England. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3-19 (U.S.
1776). See also U.S. Term Limits v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 794 (1995) ("[W]e recognized
the critical postulate that sovereignty is vested in the people, and that sovereignty confers on
the people the right to choose freely their representatives to the National Government."); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964) (quoting James Madison) ("The peo-
ple, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty"). The power of ideas has been
know even since ancient times such is what prompted the Spartans to fear outsiders.
PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH ON SPARTA 40 (Richard J. A. Talbert ed. & trans. Penguin Books
1988) ("By definition foreigners must bring foreign ideas with them, and novel ideas lead to
novel attitudes. Hence inevitably many emotions and preferences emerge which-if the exist-
20011
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the king or the federal government hold the ultimate sovereignty, is embod-
ied in the Preamble of the Constitution that states, "[w]e the people of the
United States, in [o]rder to form a more perfect Union."5 The sovereignty of
the people has important implications for First Amendment jurisprudence
because if the channels of free speech are manipulated, so is the sovereignty
of the people." A democratic society based on the sovereignty of the people
demands the free flow of ideas in order to operate. 2 Anything less is not
sovereignty, let alone democracy.53
According to Alexander Meiklejohn, "[tihe First Amendment does not
protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the freedom of those activities of
thought and communication by which we 'govern.' It is concerned, not with
a private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility." 54 It
is ironic that Meiklejohn argues that freedom to speak is not what the First
Amendment seeks to protect, but rather it protects freedom of speech.5
Meiklejohn's argument and his subtle distinction clearly seek to elevate
freedom of speech to a higher level in the hierarchy of rights protected by
the Constitution. 6 Meiklejohn forcibly argues that because we the people are
sovereign, ideas must flow freely so that that people can make educated
choices concerning self-government.' Essentially, "[fireedom of speech is a
way for the people to communicate those wishes to the government, and any
suppression of the public's stated demands is inconsistent with the notion of
government's existing for the precise purpose of responding to the demands
of the population."'
ing government be likened to a piece of music-are out of tune with it.").
50. U.S CONST. pmbl.; see also ALEXANDER MEKmEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELE-GovERNmEW 3 (1948) ("If men are to be governed, we say, then that gov-
erning must be done, not by others, but by themselves.").
51. See SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 35 ("The argument for democracy views freedom of
speech as a necessary component of a society premised on the assumption that the population
at large is sovereign.").
52. See MEIKLEXOIHN, supra note 50, at 27:
When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who must pass judg-
ment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And that means that unwise ideas
must have a hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair, dangerous as well
as safe, un-American as well as American.
Id
53. See Dana Moon Dorsett, Hate Speech and Free Expression, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 259, 274 (1997) ("In order to realize self-governance, the public's right of free expression
must exist as a requisite precondition."). See also Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural
Diversity, and the Foundation Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 117
(1992).
54. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment as an Absolute, in FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION: A COLLECTION OF BEST WRITINGS 63, 75 (Kent Middleton eds., 1981).
55. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 50, at 19.
56. Meiklejohn, supra note 54, at 75.
57. Id.
58. SCHAUER, supra note 31, at35.
[Vol. 37
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The danger in silencing speech in a society based on the sovereignty of
the people is that the people will no longer be sovereign.59 The rationale is
that without uncensored information, the people will not be able *to form
their judgments, and therefore will not be able to exercise their sovereign
power.' According to Meiklejohn, this is because "[s]elf-government can
exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity,
and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot
is assumed to express.'' Additionally, freedom of speech "makes possible
holding government officials, as public servants, properly accountable to
their masters, the population."62 Therefore, without freedom of speech we are
no longer sovereign because once that right is given up, the very decisions
we make can no longer be ours.
For example, imagine if in the world of ideas only three ideas existed -
A, B and C. If the people were truly sovereign, they would have the ability
to speak freely about all three ideas. Fully informed as to A, B and C, the
people, as the "masters" of government, could cast their ballots as to which
idea they wanted their elected representatives to effectuate. However, if the
government or some other organization suppressed idea A, the people would
lose sovereignty. The people could no longer express their will because with
knowledge of only B and C the people are denied their sovereign power to
choose A if they wish.63
59. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 50, at 68 ("If, by suppression, we attempt to avoid lesser
evils, we create greater evils. We by temporary and partial advantage at the cost of permanent
and dreadful disaster. That disaster is the breakdown of self-government.").
60. See SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 35; Meiklejohn, supra note 54, at 75.
61. Meiklejohn, supra note 54, at 75.
62. SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 35. See also MELEJOHN, supra note 50, at 65-66:
We, the People, as we plan for the general welfare, do no choose to be 'protected'
from the 'search for truth.' On the contrary, we have adopted it as our 'way of
life,' our method of doing the work of governing for which, as citizens, we are re-
sponsible. Shall we, then, as practitioners of freedom, listen to ideas which, being
opposed to our own, might destroy confidence in our form of government? Shall
we give a hearing to those who hate and despise freedom, to those who, if they had
the power, would destroy our institutions? Certainly, yes! Our actions must be
guided, not by their principles, but by ours. We listen, not because they desire to
speak, but because we need to hear. If there are arguments against our theory of
government, our policies in war or in peace, we the citizens, the rulers, must hear
and consider them for ourselves. That is the way of public safety. It is the program
of self-government.
Id.
63. SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 39:
If the people are sovereign it is not for government to decide what is true and what
is false... [an] [i]nherent ideal of self-government is the proposition that it is for
the people alone to distinguish between truth and falsity in matters relating to
broad questions of government policy.
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C. The Futility of Suppression
The history of the world has many examples of the futility of suppress-
ing ideas. History has repeatedly shown that suppression often leads to mar-
tyrdom,' or at least to greater exposure of the would-be martyr's cause.'
Ironically, some dissidents have actively sought political persecution in or-
der to give greater exposure to their views. Our courts have seen many in-
stances where political dissidents have manipulated the proceedings as a fo-
rum for expounding their views.'
Additionally, by attempting to suppress the views of dissidents, these
views may be given some legitimacy. According to Schauer this occurs be-
cause:
[B]y taking [ideas] seriously, by bothering to suppress them, we acknowl-
edge that they have enough strength and popularity to constitute a danger.
Therefore, it can be argued, we admit their presence as a substantial force
by the act of suppression, providing an aura of respectability and thus in-
creasing the probability of their gaining new adherents.67
The argument for the futility of suppression, regardless of its many behav-
ioral assumptions, is certainly in accord with both history and experience.
In the situation at hand, Dees' lawsuits aimed at silencing white su-
premacists may also encounter the futility of suppression. The civil actions
by Dees, while bankrupting certain groups, have nevertheless fortified their
resolve to expound their racist views. This resolve is evident from an under-
ground website for the Aryan Nation that has triumphantly proclaimed
"whatever transpires at Aryan Nations Hayden Lake, Idaho [the] Aryan Na-
tions will continue!"6 Ominously, but maybe prophetically, Michael Teague,
who was one of the security guards involved in the assault on the Keenans,
stated, "[t]hey think there's some magic little pill they can swallow that will
64. See NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 519 (1993).
Throughout history examples of individuals who were persecuted, then executed, later only to
arise to martyrdom abound. Joan of Arc is a prime example of this phenomenon. After being
burned at the stake, "posthumously, [she was] exonerated, and canonized. Her dedication to
the French nation symbolized the spirit of the French effort to drive the English out of
France." Id. Early saints of the Christian church were those executed in the Roman arenas.
Execution was seen as a way to demonstrate God's glory. See St. Perpetua, The Passion of
Saint Perpetua and Felicity (203), reprinted in READINGS IN MEDIEVAL HISTORY 58-64 (Pat-
rick J. Geary ed. 2d ed 1997). See also MICHAEL GRANT, JESUS: AN HISTORIAN'S REVIEW OF
THE GOSPELS 175 (1977) ("Yet after [Jesus'] death, total failure turned into enormous tri-
umph.")
65. See generally AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS (Michal R. Belknap ed. 1994).
66. Id.
67. SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 76.
68. Aryan Nations, http://www.christian-aryannation.com (last visited October 12,
2000). Hayden Lake is the site of the Aryan Nation headquarters where Victoria Keenen and
her son were attacked. Metro Desk, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2001, at A17 Because of Dees' law-
suit the Aryan Nation has been forced to sell their compound. Id.
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make Aryan Nations go away."' Dees' attempt to silence the hate-mongers
by bankrupting them has given them resolve, and a feeling of victimization
that may offer some legitimacy to an illegitimate idea."0
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW FF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Pre-Brandenburg-The Court Shall Strike Down no Law That Punishes
Communists or Malcontents
The First Amendment has a long history.' For our purposes, however,
we will begin our brief inquiry into the First Amendment jurisprudence, with
the case of Schenck v. United States.2 We begin with Schenck because it was
here where Justice Holmes first articulated the "clear and present danger
test" and where modem First Amendment jurisprudence began.73 The
Schenck case involved the infamous Espionage Act of 1917, under which the
Court permitted the punishment of malcontents of the First World War who
fought the draft.74 At issue in Schenck were leaflets, which in "impassioned
language" attempted to create resistance to the draft in the form of a proletar-
ian uprising.75 Holmes felt that the First Amendment did not protect this
speech because it was of "a nature as to create a clear and present danger"
that would "bring about substantive evils."'76 To illustrate his argument,
Holmes gave his now famous analogy: "The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic."'77
In subsequent decisions, the Court continued to view First Amendment
rights narrowly, especially with regard to socialists and anarchists.78 In
Schenck, Holmes justified the restrictions placed on speech because the
69. Kim Murphy, Jury Verdict Could Bankrupt Aryans, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 8, 2000, at Al.
70. See Dorsett, supra note 53, at 292 ("[S]ilencing attempts will only fuel public re-
sentment. Public sentiments matured on the doctrine of free expression will inevitably react
against state-sponsored silencing."). State sponsored silencing would clearly be more invidi-
ous than the silencing that has been undertaken by Morris Dees. However, one need only go
on the internet to see the reaction that Dees' lawsuits have evoked among the various hate
groups. See generally Aryan Nations, http://www.christian-aryannation.com (last visited Oc-
tober 12, 2000).
71. See generally Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression
From 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 263 (1986) (an in-depth review on freedom of ex-
pression from 1791 to 1917).
72. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
73. Id. at 52. In starting with Schenck this article admittedly ignores a substantial body of
First Amendment jurisprudence.
74. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
75. Id. at 51.
76. ld. at 52.
77. Id
78. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). See Froherk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919).
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country was in the middle of World War I. According to Holmes, "[w]hen a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitution
right."'79 World War I ended with the Treaty of Versailles; however, the ma-
jority of the Supreme Court continued its war against free speech and the
malcontents of society. Holmes' bitter dissent in Abrams v. United States
would not stop the majority of the Court in its prosecution of socialists and
its rejection of the clear and present danger test."0
In Abrams, the Supreme Court, in a familiar theme, upheld convictions
of agroup of socialists that published anti-war, pro-communist leaflets."' The
leaflet, signed "The Rebels," implored workers to "spit in the face of false,
hypocrite [sic], military propaganda which has fooled you so relentlessly,
calling forth your sympathy, your help, to prosecution of the war."" Holmes,
in his dissent, which was characterized by Rodney A. Smolla as a "haunting,
poetic masterpiece," 3 chastised the majority for its treatment of this group."
Holmes stated that "[i]n this case sentences of twenty years imprisonment
have been imposed for the publishing of two leaflets that I believe the de-
fendants had as much a right to publish as the Government has to publish the
Constitution of the United States now vainly invoked by them."' Holmes'
felt there was little danger in publication of the defendant's leaflets.86 This
provoked Holmes to belittle the majority of the Court in its treatment of this
group by saying, "[n]obody can suppose that surreptitious publishing of a
silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any immedi-
ate danger."87
While protections under the First Amendment may have been at their
nadir after Adams, the merciless abuse of the First Amendment would con-
tinue. Under the "bad tendency" test the Court took a narrow view of the
First Amendment punishing speech that had the "natural tendency and prob-
able effect to bring about the substantial evil."'8 The use of the bad tendency
79. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. It should be noted that all these violation to the espionage
act occurred while our country was engaged in the First World War.
80. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Holmes dissent in Abrams seems to
be an attempt to limit the court's witch hunts against socialist. Id. Additionally, in this dissent
Holmes articulated the "market place of ideas" theory. Id.
81. Id. at 624.
82. Id. at 620.
83. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SocIETY, 101 (1992). According to
Professor Smolla "Holmes began to doubt his own premises" in the Schenck, Debs, and
Frohwerk cases. Id. This led-to his attempt to bridle the majority in the Abrams case. Id.
84. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628-29.
85. Id. at 629.
86. Id. at 628.
87. Id
88. Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 671 (1925); see also Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
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test as the measure of First Amendment protection led Justices Holmes and
Brandeis to continually chastise the majority of the Court for its weak meas-
ure of First Amendment rights during this period.
In Whitney v. California," the Supreme Court again demonstrated its
hostility toward radical speech when it in a unanimous decision upheld the
conviction of a communist leader accused of violating California's Criminal
Syndicalism Act of 1919." This statute, tailor made to punish communists,
made it a felony to advocated force as a "means of accomplishing a change
in industrial ownership."'1 While Brandies technically concurred in this opin-
ion, he was force to due to the defendant's failure to assert a First Amend-
ment challenge to the statute.2 Constrained to reach the same result at the
majority, Brandies nonetheless embraced the marketplace of idea theory in
his concurrence and warned the Court about the ills associated with sup-
pressing free speech:
But [the founding fathers] knew that order cannot be secured merely
through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to dis-
courage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path
of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good
ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discus-
sion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its
worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities,
they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
guaranteed.93
Irrespective of any lesson that should have been learned during the First
Red Scare, the Supreme Court demonstrated twenty four years later its hos-
tility toward free speech in the decision of Dennis v. United States5. In Den-
nis, the culprit statutes was the Smith Act, which was similar to California's
Criminal Syndicalism law in Whitney, but was actually challenged with a
First Amendment claim and not decided on a technicality as was Whitney."
89. 274 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1927).
90. Id. at 360. The defendants in this case sought to organize workers into pro-
communist unions and use the power of the strike as their weapon to bring about a proletarian
state. Id. at 363-64.
91. Id. at 360.
92. Id. The importance of this case does not lie with the result, but rather with Brandeis'
concurrence. While Brandeis does technically concur, his concurrence sounds more like a dis-
sent. The defendants in this case failed to challenge the California Criminal Syndicalism law
on a First Amendment basis, thus the issue was never raised forcing Brandies to base his deci-
sion on the equal protection clause. Id. at 360-61. Under the equal protection clause the state
merely had to prove that the Syndicalism Act was not overly vague and uncertain of defini-
tion. Id- at 368.
93. Id. at 375-76 (1927) (citations omitted).
94. See BENEDicT, supra note 12, at270-71.
95. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
96. Compare Dennis, 341 U.S. at 496-97, with Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359.
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The defendants in Dennis were indicted under the Smith Act for, "conspiring
(1) to organize as the Communist Party... [a] group, who teach[es] and ad-
vocate[s] the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United
States by force and violence, and (2)... advocat[ing] and teach[ing] ... of
overthrowing.., of the United States by force and violence." While the
government's indictment seems menacing it was Justice Black's dissent that
shows the true crime of the defendants:
These petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the
Government. They were not charged with overt acts of any kind designed to
overthrow the Government. They were not even charged with saying any-
thing or writing anything designed to overthrow the Government. The
charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas
at a later date: The indictment is that they conspired to organize the Com-
munist Party and to use speech or newspapers and other publications in the
future to teach and advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government.'
As Dennis indicates, at the height of the Second Red Scare the First
Amendment was a wooden shield against a steel sword.98 The interpretation
by the Supreme Court with respect to the First Amendment "[was] not likely
to protect any but those 'safe' or orthodox views which rarely need its pro-
tection." Therefore, despite an utter impossibility of the communist group
in Dennis of overthrowing the United States government through its com-
munist teachings, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of these defen-
dants under the Smith Act.'" Viewed through the lens of modem First
Amendment Jurisprudence, the decisions of the Court during this period are
seen as an overreaction and an affront to civil liberties. It remains to be seen
whether history will judge Dees' attempts to suppress supremacist groups
through civil litigation just as harshly.
B. Brandenburg-A First Amendment Resuscitation
As indicated by Schenck, Abrams, Debs, Gitlow, and Dennis, the United
States Supreme Court has not always interpreted the First Amendment such
that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech."''
One could blame the Red Scares of the 1920s and 1950s for the Supreme
Court's conservative take on the First Amendment. However, by the 1960s a
new attitude was gripping the nation, and it was no better expressed than
through the liberal Warren Court." In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the leader of a
97. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 579 (Black, J., dissenting).
98. Cf. BENEDICT, supra note 12, at 314.
99. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 580.
100. Id. at 571.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
102. Cf. Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War: The Limits of Le-
gal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REv. 65, 66, 128 (1998) (arguing that the while the Warren Court is
often associated with liberalism it was "downright conservative" when the First Amendment
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Ku Klux Klan group invited a reporter to come film a Klan rally.' 3 During
the rally, the leader of the Klan group made a speech, stating, "[w]e're not a
revengent [sic] organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme
Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that
there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken."' 4 The Klan leader
was convicted under an archaic 1919 Criminal Syndicalism statute, which
prohibited "voluntarily assembly[ing] with any society, group, or assem-
blage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrine of criminal syndi-
calism.""' Reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court in a per curiam de-
cision pronounced the modem rule for the First Amendment interpretation
with respect to speech that advocates violence.'"4 Dispensing with the "clear
and present danger test," the new rule under Brandenburg held: "constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid
or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action."'" Therefore, under Brandenburg,
speech may not be suppressed according to Professors John E. Nowak and
Ronald D. Rotunda unless, "[t]he speech provokes, incites, an unthinking re-
action."'04 Where there is an unthinking reaction there is no time for more
speech to quell the violent tendencies of those hearing the speech.
The new rule pronounced in Brandenburg was intended to protect the
First Amendment with a firm and clear rule that was not subject to judicial
gerrymandering as the "clear and present danger" test had been.'" The
Court's desire to discard the clear and present danger test is evident from
Justice Douglas's concurrence."' Douglas wanted a test that could not be
manipulated as the "clear and present danger" test had been in Dennis."' Ac-
cording to Douglas there is "no place in the regime of the First Amendment
for any 'clear and present danger' test, whether strict and tight as some
would make it, or free-wheeling as the Court in Dennis rephrased it.""..2 In
rights of war protesters were involved).
103. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,445 (1969) (per curiam).
104. Id. at 446.
105. Id at 445.
106. Id. at 447.
107. kd; JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTTUTIONAL LAW § 16.6, at
1090 (6th ed. 2000) ("The new Brandenburg test.., now is the proper formula for determin-
ing when speech that advocates criminal conduct may constitutionally be punished.").
108. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 107, at 1089.
109. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 454 (1969) (Douglas, J. concurring) (argues that the
"clear and present" danger test was "so twisted and perverted in Dennis" and in other pre-
Brandenburg cases that the Court should totally discard the test); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 107, at 1089 ("[Douglas] was distrustful of that test, which he believed could be easily
manipulated...").
110. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449-50.
111. Id. at 454 ("When one reads the opinions closely and sees when and how the 'clear
and present' danger test has been applied, great misgivings are aroused.").
112. Id.
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essence, the new Brandenburg test was intended to give some teeth to First
Amendment protections.
C. Post-Brandenburg-The Court Gets Serious About Protecting Free
Speech
Post-Brandenburg decisions would re-affirm the values comnmitted to in
Brandenburg. The lessons learned in Adams, Whitney, and Dennis were not
to be repeated. In Cohen v. California,"3 decided amidst the turmoil of the
Vietnam War,"" the Court reaffirmed the principles of Brandenburg by vig-
orously protecting the First Amendment from the powerful conservative cur-
rent of the "silent majority."" 5 On April 26, 1968, while in a corridor outside
of a municipal court, Paul Cohen had been seen wearing a jacket that stated,
"Fuck the Draft."' 6 The lower court, using a breach of peace statute, con-
victed Cohen and sentenced him to 30 days in jail.
The state sought to support the validity of California's breach of peace
statute based on the "fighting words" doctrine."7 The "fighting words" doc-
trine, first laid out in Chaplinsky, holds that: "'fighting words' [are] those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.""' "Fighting Words," according to the Chaplinsky
Court, "have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem," such
that punishment for their utterance may readily be doled out."9 Finding justi-
fication on this basis, the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction stating: "it
was certainly reasonably foreseeable that such conduct might cause others to
rise up to commit a violent act against the person of the defendant or attempt
to forcibly remove his jacket.' 20
113. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
114. B. Franklin Cooling, The Vietnam War, 1962-1973, in AGAINST ALL ENEMIES:
INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO ThE PRESENT
352-56 (Kenneth J. Hagan & William R. Roberts eds., 1986) ("By the summer of 1971 more
than 70 percent of the American people thought it wrong to have sent American troops to
Vietnam and only 31 percent approved of Nixon's handling of the war.").
115. Cohen was decided on different reasoning than Brandenburg; however, the Cohen
decision indicates the Courts willingness to protect First Amendment rights. ALAN BRINKLEY
& ELLEN FITZPATRICK, AMERICA IN MODERN TIMES: SINCE 1941, 508 (1997). Nixon's 1968
campaign was run on the premise that Nixon was to be the mouthpiece of the "Silent Major-
ity." Id. The silent majority were those Americans who were "tired of hearing about their ob-
ligations to the poor, tired of hearing about the sacrifices necessary to achieve racial justice,
tired of judicial reforms that seemed designed to help criminals." Id. Most importantly the
"Silent Majority" sought "peace with honor" in Vietnam. Id.
116. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16.
117. Id. at20.
118. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942).
119. Id. at571-72.
120. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16.
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Conversely, the Supreme Court in Cohen decided to take a restrictive
view of the "fighting words" doctrine... and reversed the Court of Appeals,
holding that a "State may not.., make the simple public display.., of this
single expletive a criminal offense."'" According to the Supreme Court in
Cohen, "the mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does
not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech.' ' " The Court in
Cohen, noting that "free expression is powerful medicine" in our society,
was prepared to uphold Cohen's right to wear a jacket with this "distasteful"
four-letter word.' The Court was distrustful that the government could ever
"make principled distinctions in this area," thus "the Constitution leaves
matters of taste and style... to the individual."'l"
Two years after Cohen, the Supreme Court again demonstrated its
commitment to the stringent protections laid down in Brandenburg in the
case of Hess v. Indiana.26 Hess's conviction involved an anti-war demon-
stration that erupted due to the invasion of Cambodia.27 Throughout this
time the nation protested the Vietnam War.' As an indication of the inten-
sity of the times, one of these college campus anti-war demonstrations pro-
testing the invasion of Cambodia resulted in four dead students at Kent State
University after the National Guard opened fire on them.'29 The Vietnam
War, coupled with massive protests, created such violent times that the Su-
preme Court probably could not have been faulted in applying a restricted
version of the First Amendment as Holmes did in Schenck.
The anti-war demonstration that Hess was involved in included 100 to
150 demonstrators, not including the spectators that were observing the
demonstration. 3' Responding to street congestion caused by the demonstra-
tion the police attempted to disband the crowd.' Hess, apparently angered
121. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 107, at 1095. ("The Cohen limitations weakened
Chaplinsky substantially."). In Chaplinsky a Jehovah's Witness was convicted of a statute
similar to the one involved in Cohen. Chaplinsky, 314 U.S. at 569 According to the complaint
in Chaplinsky the appellant called an officer "'a God damned racketeer' and 'a damned Fas-
cist."' Id.
122. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
123. Id. at 21.
124. ld. at 24.
125. a at 25.
126. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Compare Hess v. Indiana, 414
U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973).
127. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
128. Cooling, supra note 114, at 352-53. Operation Rockcrusher was the name given to
the invasion of Cambodia. Id.
129. Id.
130. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ( "When a nation is... at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their ut-
terance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as pro-
tected by any constitutional right.").
131. Hess, 414 U.S. at 106.
132. d
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by what the police were doing shouted in a "loud voice... 'We'll take the
fucking street later."''  The Supreme Court, instead of upholding the convic-
tion under the disorderly conduct statute,'" stated, "[a]t best.., the state-
ment [by Hess] could be taken as counsel for present moderation; at worst, it
amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite
future time. This is not sufficient to permit the State to punish Hess'
speech."'35 Therefore, the Court in Hess reaffirmed the central idea in Bran-
denburg that only speech that produced imminent lawless action could be
punished; the key being that there would be no time for counter speech.'36
The result after Brandenburg suggests that only in the most narrow of
circumstances may speech, even violent speech, be suppressed. This stan-
dard is not likely to be met where the complaint is merely that of advocating
racism. Often the violent acts of ricism as alleged by Morris Dees and the
SPLC occur long after the alleged violent speech.'37 However, by using tort
theories this problem is avoided and even speech that occurred months prior
to the racial incidents may be punished.'
D. New York Times & Hustler-Recognizing the Chilling Effect of a Tort
Suit
The fact that the actions brought by Dees against groups such as the Ar-
yan Nation are tort actions instead of criminal suits should not diminish First
Amendment protections.'39 Both tort suits and statutes have the same poten-
tial to inhibit free speech."4 The Court recognized this problem in New York
133. Id. at 107. It is not clear whether Hess said, "We'll take the fucking street later," or
whether he said, "We'll take the fucking street again." Id. These facts were stipulated to, Id.
134. See id. at 105; Contra David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech,
Communicative Torts, and the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 18
(1994) ("because its emphasis of imminent law violations, coupled with the defendant's
statement that the street would be taken 'later,' seems to immunize even the most brazen in-
citement, if the crime is to take place a few moments in the future."). The article argues
against the approach taken by the majority in Hess. Id.
135. Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
136. Id. at 108-09.
137. See generally Taylor, supra note 18, at 95.
138. Dees & Bowden, supra note 17, at 28. Dee's tort theories do not implicate the First
Amendment per se, but the chilling effects of these suits on free speech raise first amendment
issues.
139. See generally New York Times v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Compare Rice v.
Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Circuit allowed plaintiffs
to hold Paladin Enterprises civilly liable for aiding and abetting. Id. The defendants published
a manual on how to commit murder for hire entitled Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Inde-
pendent Contractors. Id. This case may signify a step back from the principles of Branden-
burg and New York Times, or it may just be a reaction to the extreme nature of the speech in
that case. The publishers involved in this case stipulated that they "actually intended to pro-
vide assistance to murderers and would-be murderers." Id. at 242.
140. Tort suits have become increasingly dangerous to First Amendment rights. See
Richard C. Ausness, The Application of Product Liability Principles to Publishers of Violent
or Sexually Explicit Material, 52 FLA. L. REv. 603, 664-70 (arguing that unchecked tort ac-
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Times v. Sullivan: "[t]he fear of damage awards under a rule such as that in-
voked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more inhibiting than the
fear of prosecution under a criminal statute."''
The New York Times case involved the tort of libel.142 L. B. Sullivan, the
commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, claimed that an advertisement
critical of the Montgomery Police Department libeled him in his official ca-
pacity. 43 Even though the advertisement never mentioned Sullivan by name,
nor were the alleged libelous statements more than minor mistakes, Sullivan
was awarded $500,000 in damages by an Alabama jury. " Prior to this case
libel was considered low value speech, thus outside the protections of the
First Amendment.45 The Supreme Court in New York Times realized the
grave danger to free speech if superficial tort actions were permitted against
those with differing views." These tort actions lacked the traditional protec-
tions afforded to defendants in criminal actions. "7 Essentially, the Supreme
Court feared that high civil awards could render First Amendment rights im-
potent through a process of "self-censorship."'4 8 Justice Douglas in his con-
currence recognized that this large verdict was a result of the hostility toward
"outside agitators."'49 The Court, in an effort to prevent "self censorship,"
required that "public officials" in a defamation suit prove "actual malice" on
the part of the publisher."5 In coming to its decision to add constitutional
protections to the law of defamation, the Court recognized the differences
tions against media defendants could have a chilling effect on free speech.)
141. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277.
142. Id. at 256.
143. l at 256-57.
144. Id. at 294. One of the alleged libelous statements was that the Montgomery police
had ringed the campus of Alabama State when in actuality they had not ringed the campus,
but merely were present in large numbers. Id. at 259.
145. Beauharnais v. Illinois 343 U.S. 250, 257, 266 (1952) (holding that libel was not
protected by the First Amendment because "such utterances are no essential part of any expo-
sition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."). See
generally Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297 (1995).
Professor Shaman provides a thorough analysis of low value speech and the approaches taken
by the Supreme Court.
146. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 294 (Black, J., concurring) ("There is no reason to be-
lieve that there are not more such huge verdicts lurking just around the comer for the Times
or any other newspaper or broadcaster which might dare to criticize public officials.").
147. See id. at 277-78 (1964). See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Us-
ing Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending
the Criminal-Civil Law, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1389 (arguing that civil actions lack the pro-
cedural protections afforded to the criminal defendants.)
148. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 294.
149. 1d. at 295. This decision occurred in the middle of the civil rights movement. See
BENEDicT, supra note 12, at 317-18. L.B. Sullivan was a key figure in the fight against deseg-
regation. According to Sullivan, "Not since Reconstruction have our customs been in such
jeopardy ... We can, will and must resist outside forces hellbent on our destruction." WADE,
supra note 45, at 306.
150. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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between civil and criminal actions.' In a criminal suit the defendant would
at least get the benefit of the requirements of "an indictment and of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt."'' Additionally, in a civil suit there is "no dou-
ble-jeopardy limitation."''
In essence, New York Times demonstrates that civil lawsuits have the
same potential to inhibit free speech, as do criminal statutes, and therefore
should receive constitutional protections when free speech is threatened. 5'
Additionally, the Court did not restrict the rationale of New York Times was
to the law of defamation, but was also adapted to the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress in Hustler v. Falwell.55 Hustler involved a par-
ody depicting Jerry Falwell, a well-known minister, in a "drunken incestuous
rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse."'56 While the parody was
"doubtless[ly] gross and repugnant in the eyes of most,"'" the Court never-
theless applied the protections announced in New York Times in order to pro-
tect the "robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment."'' Ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist, "[a]t the heart of the First Amendment is the
recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and
opinions on matters of public interest and concern."'5 9 Justice Rehnquist
went on to say, "[t]he First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a 'false'
idea."'" Both New York Times and Hustler demonstrated a willingness by
151. Id. at 277-278.
152. Id. at 277.
153. Id. at 278.
154. ld. at 279-80 (1964). Cf. Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
155. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 46.
156. Id. at 48. The facts as discussed by the court:
The inside front cover of the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a
'parody' of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur that contained the name and
picture of respondent and was entitled 'Jerry Falwell talks about his first time.'
This parody was modeled after actual Campari ads that included interviews with
various celebrities about their 'first times.' Although it was apparent by the end of
each interview that this meant the first time they sampled Campari, the ads clearly
played on the sexual double entendre of the general subject of 'first times.' Copy-
ing the form and layout of these Campari ads, Hustler's editors chose respondent
as the featured celebrity and drafted an alleged 'interview' with him in which he
states that his 'first time' was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his
mother in an outhouse. The Hustler parody portrays respondent and his mother as
drunk and immoral, and suggests that respondent is a hypocrite who preaches only
when he is drunk. In small print at the bottom of the page, the ad contains the dis-
claimer, 'ad parody-not to be taken seriously.' The magazine's table of contents
also lists the ad as 'Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody.'
Il
157. Id. at 50.
158. Id. at 51.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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the Court to be creative in order to protect free speech from large civil
awards.
161
In sum, the cases of New York Times and Hustler recognize that tort
suits may chill free speech. The crucial importance of free speech requires
that breathing space be provided to the First Amendment. In some instances
individual plaintiffs seeking redress may have to suffer the consequences of
this need to protect free speech. However, as New York Times and Hustler
indicate, a proper balance of interests proper may be found. Courts and legis-
latures will have to fashion protections that act in to preserve both the indi-
vidual's interest, and societal interests. Additional procedural protections
placed upon civil suits aimed at bankrupting unpopular hate groups may be
the only way of balancing the interests involve.
IV. MORRIS DEES' STRATEGY
In the 1960s, sit-ins, protests, and a call for legislative change were seen
as the preferred method for changing society for the better. Today, however,
guided by people such as Dees, civil litigation is seen as the "primary
weapon" to bring about change." Using civil litigation, Dees, the co-founder
of the Southern Poverty Law Center, has attained incredible success by fi-
nancially hobbling supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and the
Aryan Nation.'" Using theories such as aiding and abetting, civil conspiracy
and respondeat superior Dees has been able to hold the heads of hate groups
vicariously liable for the acts of their members and do what federal and state
statutes have failed to accomplish." This section will briefly survey three of
the SPLC's most successful civil victories."
The case that established the true potency of civil litigation in silencing
unpopular groups was the Michael Donald suit. 7 Donald, an Ethiopian
161. The addition of the "actual malice" issue to claims of defamation involving public
officials and public figures is a creative way to protect free speech. See New York Times, 376
U.S. at 280; Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56.
162. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277-80; Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56.
163. STANTON, supra note 21, at 12 ("[the] primary weapon [of the Southern Poverty
Law Center], the lawsuit rather than the sit-in."). Martin Luther King, Jr. advocated "nonvio-
lent direct action" as a way to bring about a bloodless revolution in the area of civil rights.
KING, supra note 11, at 77-79. The purpose of nonviolent direct action was to bring the racial
disparity issue to those who wished to avoid it. Id. King likened nonviolent direct action to
Socrates' constant questioning of the Athenians. id.
164. See generally Taylor, supra note 18.
165. Dees & Bowden, supra note 17, at 24-27; Taylor, supra note 18, at 104. See gener-
ally JACK LEvIN & JACK McDEviTr, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND
BLOODsHED 195 (1993).
166. The examples given are only a few of the many lawsuits that Morris Dees has
brought against various hate groups. For a good chronological rendition of the lawsuits
brought by Morris Dees and the Southern Poverty law center see
http://www.splcenter.org/legalactionla-idex.htn-l (last visited October 12, 2000). Often these
lawsuits settle before going to trial. Il
167. See STANTON, supra note 21, at 205-46.
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graduate student, was brutally murdered by Ku Klux Klan members Henry
Hays and Tiger Knowles; both of whom were virtually penniless, and there-
fore judgment-proof in any civil suit.'" The main organization under which
Hays and Knowles were taught their racist views was not judgment-proof.
From the beginning, the "goal was to take the United Klans of America
(UKA) for every asset it had."'69 To accomplish this goal Dees had to "bor-
row from the world of corporate law," and argue "an agencylike [sic] the-
ory."1'7 A lawsuit merely implicating Hays and Knowledes would do little to
stop the UKA from spreading its views. Therefore, according to Damon
Henderson Talyor, "[t]he SPLC wanted to use civil conspiracy and aiding
and abetting to show how the two murderers were acting on behalf of the
UKA when they brutally killed Michael Donald, thereby making the UKA
itself liable for the actions of its members.'' Essentially, Dees was able to
find vicarious liability by demonstrating that the United Klans of America
preached violence to its members, and thus prepared them to commit violent
acts against minorities." As a result of this suit Dees was able to hold the
UKA liable for seven million dollars. The suit was so devastating to the
UKA that they had to surrender their headquarters to the victim's mother in
order to satisfy the judgment.
The next major victory achieved by the Southern Poverty Law Center
using civil litigation was against Tom Metzger. 7 1 Metzger, a militant bigot
who openly advocated racial violence, became an easy target for Dees' civil
litigation strategy. Again, Dees employed garden-variety tort theories of aid-
ing and abetting and civil conspiracy to destroy the infrastructure of this
group. 76 The basis of Dees' theory was that the racist teachings of Metzger's
White Aryan Resistance (WAR), coupled with the paramilitary training of
skinheads, created the required "substantial assistance or encouragement"
necessary to create vicarious liability after members of WAR murdered an
Ethiopian student.'Inflammatory evidence demonstrating Metzger's advo-
cacy of violence included an issue of his "Aryan Youth Movement" news-
168. Taylor, supra note 18, at 129.
169. STANTON, supra note 21, at 205- 46.
170. Id. at 199.
171. Taylor, supra note 18, at 130.
172. STANTON, supra note 21, at 120. At the center of Dee's case was a "drawing of a
white man addressing the reader, accompanied by the caption 'It's Terrible The Way Blacks
Are Being Treated! All Whites Should Work To Give The Blacks What They Deserve." Id.
The drawing featured a picture of a black man who was hung by the neck. Id.
173. Id. at 246.
174. Id.
175. Berhanu v. Metzger, 850 P.2d 373 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1106 (1994).
See also Taylor, supra note 18, at 129.
176. Berhanu, 850 P.2d at 376.
177. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (1979); LEviN & McD.vn-r, supra note 165,
at 102-03. See also Taylor, supra note 18, at 138-39.
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paper that had titles such as "Clash and Bash."'' 8 As a result of the trial,
WAR was held civilly liable for $12.5 million.' The result, according to
Taylor, was that "[a]rguably, the judgment against WAR's leader Tom
Metzger rendered him ineffective as a preacher of hate. He has lost his main
source of income--donations from WAR members, as well as his meeting
hall, video equipment, a personal computer, printer and fax machine, and his
home."' " Metzger attempted to argue that, under Brandenburg, his speech
was protected because of the attenuated link between his speech and the ra-
cial violence. However, Dees' use of the theories of civil conspiracy and aid-
ing and abetting enabled him to avoid the constitutional protections.'
To prove civil conspiracy one must show that the defendants acted "pur-
suant to a common design."' 2 This is a broad and malleable theory is tailor
to finding vicarious liability in hate crime cases. The speech in the Metzger
case was that of violence and racial separatism.'83 The dogma espoused to
obtain this empire often involved advocacy of violence." Therefore, when
members of Metzger's group, trained in racial violence, attacked and killed
an Ethiopian student, it was not hard for a jury to find civil conspiracy.
For a plaintiff to prove aiding and abetting it must be shown that the de-
fendant "knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself."'" An example in the restatement illustrates the tort: "A, a police-
man, advises other policemen to use illegal methods of coercion upon B. A
is subject to liability to B for batteries committed in accordance with the ad-
vice."' 6 According to Dees, "[d]efendants may be held liable without having
planned or known about the specific injurious action." Therefore, when aid-
ing and abetting is used against hate groups, juries are likely to see the po-
litically incorrect rhetoric of the group's leaders as providing for the substan-
tial assistance necessary to satisfy the elements of the tort.
The constitutional protections of Brandenburg are avoided under the
theories of civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting because of characteriza-
tion of the speech in question. Ostensibly these lawsuits should be objection-
able based on Brandenburg. In both cases the violent acts occurred long af-
ter the racist speech. While it is true according to Dees, "that a crime...
committed by words alone does not immunize it from being unlawful,"'8 7 we
178. LEvIN & McDEvr-r, supra note 165, at 102-03.
179. Southern Poverty Law Center, Legal Action at http://www.splcenter.org/ legalac-
tion/la-idex.html (last visited October 12, 2000).
180. Taylor, supra note 18, at 138-39.
181. Berhanu, 850 P.2d at 376.
182. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (1979).
183. See LEVIN & McDEvrrT, supra note 165, at 101-02.
184. Id.
185. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
186. Id.
187. Dees & Bowden supra note 17, at 28.
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must be careful not to ignore the rationale of Brandenburg in order to find a
more palpable result.'88 Allowing the use of civil conspiracy and aiding and
abetting in these cases may in the final analysis be intellectually dishonest."9
The most recent case by Dee, as discussed earlier, resulted in a stunning
victory against the Aryan Nation.' Once again using tort theories, Dees was
able to impute the tortious conduct of the members of a hate group to the
main organization.' The Idaho judge who presided over the hearing for a
new trial stated, "the organization knowingly retained individuals with a
propensity for violence as security guards and then failed to adequately
oversee them."'" The attorney for the Aryan Nation, astounded by the enor-
mous punitive damage award told reporters, "[firee speech was put to rest
today in a rural courtroom in the back country of Idaho."'93
In this case liability was not directly based on the speech as in the Mi-
chael Donald and Metzger suit. Instead liability was based on the employ-
ment relationship that the security guards had with the Aryan Nation.'94
Therefore, in this case Brandenburg is not even an issue because the tort is
not based on speech. Nevertheless, important free speech issues still remain.
Suits such as these will tend to chill free speech because the fear such law-
suits generate among hate groups. Other hate groups may engage in self-
censorship because of a worry about becoming the next victim of Dees. Ad-
ditionally, the high amount of punitive damages in this case tends to indicate
that it was the views of the Aryan Nation being punished and not the actual
act. Such use of punitive damages may be an unconstitutional form of con-
tent discrimination.
All three cases demonstrate how tort litigation can cripple free speech.
Criticizing these cases is morally difficult because of violent nature of the
defendants and the presence of innocent victims. In fact, the tort theories
employed by Dees are not unique and are framed in terms of compensating
victims and punishing undesirable conduct. At first glance, these suits do
not appear to differ from the countless other torts suits litigated in American
courts. However, they are different because the objective is not to make the
plaintiffs whole, but to silence white supremacists that offer American teens
a mixture of racism, rebellion and violence. Silencing these supremacists
188. Civil conspiracy requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted "pursuant to
a common plan." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876. Aiding and Abetting requires the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant "knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself." Id.
189. This is an argument for a later date. The focus of this article is on the general use of
civil litigation to chill free speech, not to analysis any one theory used in such civil litigation.
190. Kim Murphy, Jury Verdict Could Bankrupt Aryans, L.A. TimEs, Sept. 8, 2000, at
Al.
191. See id.
192. Kim Murphy, White Supremacist Defy Rain, Jeers in Idaho, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 29,
2000, atA1, A16.
193. Murphy, supra note 190, at Al.
194. See Complaint, supra note 19.
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through tort litigation is no less dubious as if a statute where passed making
such speech illegal.
V. CHILLING FREE SPEECH: SIDESTEPPING THE FIRST AMENDMENT WITH
TORT LITIGATION
Morris Dees' strategy of using the mundane theories of tort litigation to
silence white supremacists has succeeded where statutes intended to have the
same effect have failed. Statutes that prohibit certain types of speech based
on content are now typically unconstitutional after R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
Minnesota.' One might ask, why should a tort be permitted where a statute
would not be permitted? The difference may be as Professor Delgado points
out, "[iun tort law it is the intent and injury that matter, not the content of the
speech.""' Therefore, by framing the issue in benign terms of merely com-
pensating for injury and punishing socially unreasonable conduct, promoters
of these tort actions diminish free speech issues and allow damage to be
done to First Amendment rights.'97 In essence they seek to narrow the time
195. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992) (holding a statute that
prohibits even unprotected fighting words is unconstitutional if it discriminates based on con-
tent). Compare Wisconsin v. Mitchell 508 U.S. 476, 486-90 (1993) ((holding that penalty-
enhancements based on the racial motive of the crime do not violate the First Amendment be-
cause they punish conduct not speech). See also Craig Peyton Gaumer, Punishment For
Prejudice: A Commentary on the Constitutionality and Utility of State Statutory Responses to
the Problem of Hate Crimes, 39 S.D. L. REv. 1, 27-48 (arguing that penalty enhancements
such as those permitted under Wisconsin v. Mitchell run afoul of constitutional protections.);
Holly Coates Keehn, Terroristic Religious Speech: Giving the Devil the Benefit of the First
Amendment Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, 28 SETON HALL L. REy. 1230, 1246
("The Supreme Court apparently sounded the death knell for hate-speech legislation in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.").
196. Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Essay II. Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chick-
ens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objectives To Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REv.
871, 890 (1994); see also Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial In-
sults, Epithets, and Name Calling, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTiVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 89, 109-10 (Charles R. Lawrence et al. eds.,
1993). Professor Delgado suggests that an analysis of racial insults under the criteria set forth
by Professor Thomas Irwin Emerson places racial insults outside First Amendment Protec-
tions. Id. at 106-09. Delgado proposes a new tort action for racial insults. Il In order to suc-
ceed a plaintiff must prove, "language was addressed to him or her by the defendant that was
intended to demean through reference to race; that the plaintiff understood as intended to de-
mean through reference to race; and that a reasonable person would recognize as a racial in-
suit." Id. at 109. Delgado's tort action is different in kind from what Morris Dees is doing be-
cause it seeks to hold the individual speaker liable, not the entire group. See id. Furthermore,
under Delgado's theory only those who actually address hate speech toward a specific person
could be liable. id. at 109-10. Dees' lawsuit are far more inclusive because the actual speakers
of hate may not have communicated anything to the victim. Dees & Bowden, supra note 17,
at 24-26.
197. See, e.g., Dees & Bowden, supra note 17, at 27. The purposes of tort actions do not
directly implicate any First Amendment issue because of the rationale of a tort action. See
generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 6 (5th
ed. 1984) (arguing that liability is "based upon conduct which is socially unreasonable," and
that the "common thread" of all torts is that they seek to remedy "unreasonable interference
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frame and focus solely on the tangible injury. They ignore the chilling effect
that such tort suits have on speech in general.'98 Underlying these garden-
variety tort actions is a vigorous effort to silence a specific group because of
the content of its message.'99 There is danger in singling out one type of
speech. As Professor James Weinstein notes: "the American experience has
shown that any attempt to microsurgically remove even small categories of
'worth-less' speech from public discourse can seriously damage the vitality
of the free expression crucial to democracy. '
A. Balancing the Interests Looking for Principles
As the forgoing has demonstrated there are important concerns on both
sides of the issue. The optimum balance between society's right to be free
from racial violence and the right of hate-mongers to be free from oppressive
civil litigation is not clear from any perspective. What is clear is that the lib-
erties of the First Amendment are among our most fundamental."0 ' The inter-
play of ideas in the "Market Place" is essential in order for a diverse society
such as ours to evolve toward the better.2"
with the interests of others.").
198. Morris Dees' analysis of the First Amendment focuses solely on the Brandenburg
test, and ignores any possible chilling effect his tort actions may have on free speech. Dees &
Bowden, supra note 17, at 27.
199. After Morris Dees' victory against the Aryan Nation he told reporters that, "(w]e
intend to take every single asset from the Aryan Nations now and forever." Jess Walter, Jury
Awards $6.3 Million to Woman, Son in Aryan Nation Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2000, at
A34 In article dubiously attributed to Edgar J. Steele posted on the internet, Steele com-
mented on a supposed conversation he had with Morris Dees. According to the article attrib-
uted to Steele: "Dees told me last week that this was no free speech case, as I have repeatedly
observed. My response? 'Well then, Mr. Dees, why are you here, all the way from the deep
South, to push a case that really involves nothing more than a two-bit assault, and that by
people other than the ones you publicly claim you are out to bankrupt?" Edgar J. Steele,
Teaching Resistance, at http://www.deswatch.com/stinkin.html (last visited November 27,
2000). Regardless of whether this interaction ever occurred it points out an important point:
the reason for the suit is the group viewpoint not the underlying tort. Thus the award is an
attempt to punish a viewpoint.
200. James Weinstein, An American's View of the Canadian Hale Speech Decisions, in
FREE EXPRESSION: ESSAYS IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 175, 203 (W.J. Waluchow eds., 1994).
Professor Weinstein criticizes the Canadian Supreme Court for its decision in three hate
propaganda cases. Id. at 218-20. According to Weinstein, the Canadian Supreme Court found
the anti-hate propaganda laws constitutional in each case. Id. at 176. Weinstein in particular
criticizes the Canadian Supreme Court in its misuse of United States law in order to come to
its decision. Id. at 177-201. See also Curtis, supra note 11, at 54-57 (arguing that those who
would restrict speech in order to protect minorities fail to heed the lessons of history).
201. Robert B. Mckay, The Preference for Freedom, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A
COLLECTION OF BEST WRITINGS 21, 61 (Kent Middleton eds., 1981) ("The freedoms of the
First Amendment, particularly the freedoms of speech and thought, are so vital to the tradition
of the free society that their primacy must be recognized in sufficiently varied ways to ac-
commodate to the various contexts in which these crucial rights may be challenged.)
202. Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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A nation built on the sovereignty of the people cannot survive if ideas
are artificially withheld from the people.3 Suppression of even illegitimate
ideas often leads to their strengthening, and it is often better to allow these
illegitimate ideas to whither away due to their failure in the market place of
ideas . ' Society must also not forget the lessons of history that demonstrate
the perils in silencing free speech. Past mistakes of meeting dissidence with
suppression must be avoided and replaced with the force of our arguments. 5
In our quest to build "a more perfect union" we must not do damage to the
very institutions that make our country so great.
Accordingly, in crafting any proposed limitation on speech we must be
careful to avoid limitations that discriminate based on content.Y Discrimina-
tion based on content inherently leads to arbitrary decisions. 0 7 Furthermore
in a society that values freedom of speech as ours even advocacy of violence
is permissible, and it is only when such advocacy leads to imminent lawless
action is it permissible to silence such speech. Protectors of civil liberties
must be aware that private lawsuits can be just as damaging to the rights of
free speech as government regulations.0 ' Therefore, in allowing such tort
suits to proceed courts must be vigilant in not allowing important First
Amendment principles to be trampled.
Nevertheless, before courts can apply constitutional protections to tort
suits aimed at silencing hate speech, some state action must be present. Con-
stitutional protections apply-with the exception of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment-solely to the actions of the state."° Individuals unsupported by the
state may generally silence other citizens without running afoul of the First
Amendment. However, because the lawsuits at hand rely on the power of
courts to silence hate groups, state action may be found."' In Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co. a party's use of peremptory challenges to exclude ju-
rors based on race formed a basis for state action because the court's role in
the trial process.2 ' Likewise, Dees is using the courts as a tool to violate
constitutional rights with his tort suits and such suits rely on the court's in-
herent power and its exercise of that authority. Therefore, the actions of
203. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964) (."The people, not the
government, possess the absolute sovereignty."' (quoting James Madison)); FREDERICK
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 77 (1982).
204. SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 76.
205. We must not repeat the mistakes made by the Supreme Court in earlier decisions.
See generally Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Froherk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
206. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
207. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and The First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARYL. REv. 189 (1983).
208. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988).
209. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,25-26 (1883).
210. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991); Shelly v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1948).
211. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624.
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Dees and the SPLC should be found to involve adequate governmental ac-
tion such that the protections of the First Amendment are applicable.
B. Measures to Prevent Chilling of Free Speech With Tort Litigation
Framing the interests involved within the above guidelines would be the
most basic step courts could take to protect free speech. Additionally, there
are more commonplace measures courts can take to insure that free speech is
not chilled by tort suits aimed specifically at silencing certain types unpopu-
lar speech.
One procedural safeguard that would help prevent chilling of speech
would be an increased burden of proof in cases where suppression of speech
is an underlining motive in bringing the suit. An increase in the burden of
proof to the "clear and convincing evidence" standard from the current "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard would help solve the problem."' It is
not unprecedented to increase the burden of proof where fundamental rights
are involved. The Supreme Court "has mandated an intermediate standard of
proof--"clear and convincing evidence"-when the individual interests at
stake in a state proceeding are both "particularly important" and "more sub-
stantial than mere loss of money."' Such a standard may help tame juries
that might give plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt in order to punish these
hate groups for their views. The current measure of proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence places juries, already barely able to apply the law to the
facts, in a position where emotions may supplement legal principles.2 '
Therefore, in cases where free speech is imperiled by tort suits, courts must
apply a standard of proof that will do justice to the weighty issues.215
In addition, Courts would be well advised to look to the jurisprudence
that has arisen in response to "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participa-
tion," or better known as (SLAPP) suits. The jurisprudence arising out of
212. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).
213. Id.
214. Thomas A. Waldman, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Law and In
the Courts' Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1001 (1992); Douglas
G. Smith, Structural and Functional aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals
for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441,498-90 (1997). Common Problems with Juries in the United
States:
(1)[the jury system] results in lengthy, expensive trials; (2) it results in decisions
that are contrary to the principles of law that judges would apply; (3) jurors are
more likely to be prejudiced than professional judges; (4) jurors give no reasons
for their decisions; and (5) jury decision making leads to legal uncertainty.
Id. at 490. The author points out that these flaws may be mitigated by other factors. Id.
215. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277-78. The court in New York Times noted that the
damages awarded in the civil defamation suit were greater that those awarded under a Ala-
bama criminal statute regulating criminal libel. In particular the unfairness result in that the
civil defendant did not receive the same protections as the criminal defendant, but the civil
defendant was subjected to much higher damages. Id. at 277.
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SLAPP suits could help courts determine when the interest of a plaintiff in a
tort suit may be overcome by the need to give breathing space to the First
Amendment."' Professor Pring, a leading authority on SLAPP suits, argues
that SLAPP suits are "attempts to use civil tort action to stifle political ex-
pression."" The torts involved in SLAPP suits vary, but typically SLAPP
suits are brought against citizens who attempt to influence governmental
bodies that make policy by exercising their first amendment rights."i One of
the main dangers of SLAPP suits, much like the tort suits utilized by Dees, is
their chilling effect on free speech. 19 In dealing with SLAPP suits, courts
have had to balance the interests of free speech with the interests of deserv-
ing plaintiffs seeking remedies for valid injuries.22
California was one of the first states to enact SLAPP legislation in re-
sponse to "a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition
for the redress of grievances.""22 To combat the chilling effect of such
SLAPP suits, California provided defendants with the "strongest medicine
yet to discourage the filing of SLAPP suits." '2 Plaintiffs that bring civil suits
involving issues of freedom of speech are required to "establish that there is
a probability that [they] will prevail on the claim."223 Failure to meet this
burden would subject the plaintiff to a "special motion to strike."' While
enacting statutory protections to protect hate-mongers is an unlikely proposi-
216. The suits brought by Dees involve many competing interests. There are the interests
of the plaintiffs seeking redress and the weighty interest of the First Amendment. It is beyond
this Comment to find the mark where this line must be drawn.
217. George W. Pring, "SLAPPS"-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation-A
New Ethical, Tactical, and Constitutional Dilemma, C534 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 937 (1990).
218. See generally Alice Glover & Marcus Jimison, S.LA.P.P. Suits: A First Amendment
Issue and Beyond, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 122 (1995). The most common tort theories advanced
by SLAPP plaintiffs are defamation, business torts, civil rights violations, and conspiracy to
commit tortious acts. Id. at 129-32. Victor J. Cosentino, Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation: An Analysis of the Solutions, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 399, 402 (1990-91) ("Unlike
legitimate lawsuits, SLAPPs are not filed to seek compensation or to make right a perceived
wrong. Rather they are filed for any of four motives: retaliation for successful opposition, dis-
oouraging future opposition, intimidation, and as a strategic tool in a political battle.").
219. Cosentino, supra note 218, at 403-05.
220. Waldman, supra note 214, at 985-86. The main difference between the defendants
in SLAPP suits and the defendants in the tort suits brought by Morris Dees in that the SLAPP
plaintiff's speech is clearly protected. Often in the case of hate-mongers it is not as clear
whether they have violated the Brandenburg test in that their speech advocates imminent vio-
lence.
221. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b) (1) (Deering 2000). See generally Jerome I.
Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection Unburdening the Right of Petition in California, 32
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 965 (1999). In addition to giving a good overview of this area of law,
Braun's article provides a detailed legislative history of California's SLAPP statute. Id. at
1001-09.
222. Glover & Jimison, supra note 218, at 141.
223. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16(b) (1).
224. ld.
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tion in our day and age, such protections would certify our commitment to
freedom of speech to protect even an undesirable viewpoint.'m
C. Who Will Receive This Added Protection?
Determining who should be entitled to these added protection presents
some difficult problems. After all, the theories used by Dees are merely gar-
den-variety tort actions. One might ask why hate groups faced with a tort
suit should be given any extra protection than a common business or indi-
vidual. Furthermore, while Dees' use civil conspiracy and aiding and abet-
ting at least have objections based on Brandenburg, his use of negligent hir-
ing, as in the Aryan Nation case, facially raises no free speech issues.
Nevertheless, hate groups should be given extra protection from politically
targeted civil suits, regardless of its form, because of the purpose of hate
groups.
A two-prong test could be used to determine whether groups should get
additional procedural safeguards in civil litigation such as the special motion
to strike or a higher burden of proof. First, courts must determine whether
the group's main purpose is expressive activity. Second, a court must deter-
mine whether there is a nexus between the group's expressive activity and
the lawsuit. The civil cases brought by Dees' against these hate groups
would satisfy the test. Hate groups, despite the distastefulness of their mes-
sage, have as their main purpose the expression of a particular point of
view-white superiority. Additionally, the main point of the suits is to bank-
rupt these groups because of this message. Therefore, to insure that First
Amendment rights are given due respect additional procedural safeguards
need to apply to these suits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Freedom of speech is not merely a luxury to be defended in times of
peace and plenty, but rather a delicate tool that facilitates understanding. In
the Market Place of Ideas, propaganda of racial hatred will certainly fall prey
to its own inherent fallacies. History should serve as a reminder that toler-
ance can only be taught by example and not force. A literal implementation
of the First Amendment's provision that "no law shall be made" may not
seem to be a feasible proposition in an age where verbal acts arguably pro-
225. Curtis, supra note 11, at 29 (arguing that "the idea of a broadly defined right to free
speech is under siege."). Professor Curtis points out that many of the social ills associated
with racism have solutions other than by limiting free speech. Id. Curtis notes that "law pro-
fessors often devote more attention to advancing equality by limiting speech than to advanc-
ing equality through economic change, access to education, guaranteed employment, or for
redistribution of wealth." Id. at 33. Limiting free speech in an effort to solve these social ills is
considered "cheap" in comparison to other possible methods. Id. at 34.
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duce harms as great as physical acts. Nevertheless, we must not abandon this
principle merely because those that it protects are those that we despise.
Ending racism should be a cause that we all undertake to accomplish;
therefore, I commend Dees in his commitment to this proposition. Arguably,
hate speech is more than "offensive or disagreeable," because it is often
harmful to the victim. 6 Nonetheless, Dees, in his passion to end racism by
bankrupting hate-mongers, has introduced dangerous side effects. The side
effects are the chilling of free speech and content discrimination. Commend-
able as the goal of ending racism may be, civil litigation's dangerous side ef-
fect may not justify the end. 27 Civil litigation against hate groups may pro-
duce short gains such as bankrupting a few head hate-mongers, but it will do
little to address the underlining problem. Racism is a problem of people. As
a problem of people, it must be solved by promoting greater understanding
among racial groups." The First Amendment and it protections of free
speech are the tool to bring about that understanding. Freedom of speech is a
core value not because it is a luxury, but because it facilitates understanding
in diverse societies as our own. Civil litigation of the type pursued by Dees
can only pull people apart. Suppression of free speech by civil litigation is
no less dubious than a governmental statute to the same effect. Courts must
be vigilant to prevent such abuses; otherwise the price to speak one's mind
may become too high for all of us. Therefore, we must heed the lessons both
ancient and modem and not allow tort litigation to become the modem-day
hemlock.
Jason Paul Saccuzzo*
226. See Matsuda, supra note 9, at 2379-81 (arguing that the victims of hate speech need
to be given more consideration in the decision whether or not to permit racist speech. The
rights of victims require suppression of racist speech, "not because it isn't really speech...
because it is wrong.").
227. See also Curtis, supra note 11, at 52. Professor Curtis in writing about the good in-
tentions of those who would place restrictions on speech to protect minorities notes: "The
road to Hell is paved with good intentions." Id.
228. Charles R. Calleros, Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes:
A Reply to Delgado and Yun, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1249, 1257-63 (1995). Speech is often the best
method to bring about understanding among people. Professor Calleros offers some real
world examples where speech was able to bring about solutions where punishment would
have surely failed. Id.
. J.D. Candidate April 2002, California Western School of Law; B.A., History, Univer-
sity of California San Diego, 1999. The help of many people made this article possible. Spe-
cial thanks goes to Dr. Frank Miskiel for his guidance and patience in helping me become a
better writer. I would also like to thank Professor Glenn Smith, Professor Mathew Ritter,
Tom McKinney and Jennifer Crean, Esq. for their valuable criticisms and comments. Finally
and most important, it was the love and support of my beautiful finance, Michall Ann Fabry,
that truly made this article possible.
2001]
31
Saccuzzo: Bankrupting the First Amendment: Using Tort Litigation to Silence
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2000
32
California Western Law Review, Vol. 37 [2000], No. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss2/6
